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At approximately 63 seconds into the flight
ofSkylab 1 on May 14, 1973, an anomaly oc-
curred which resulted in the complete loss of
the meteoroid shield around the orbital
workshop. This was followed by the loss of
one of the two solar array systems on the
workshop and a failure of the interstage
adapter to separate from the S-II stage of the
Saturn V launch vehicle. The investigation
reported herein identified the most probable
cause of this flight anomaly to be the
breakup and loss of the meteoroid shield due
to aerodynamic loads that were not account-
ed for in its design. The breakup of the mete-
oroid shield, in turn, broke the tie downs
that secured one of the solar array systems to
the workshop. Complete loss of this solar ar-
ray system occurred at 593 seconds when the
exhaust plume of the S-II stage retro-rockets
impacted the partially deployed solar array
system. Falling debris from the meteoroid
shield also damaged the S-II interstage
adapter ordnance system in such a manner
as to preclude separation.
Of several possible failure modes of the
meteoroid shield that were identified, the
most probable in this particular flight was
internal pressurization of its auxiliary tun-
nel which acted to force the forward end of
the meteoroid shield away from the shell of
the workshop and into the supersonic air
stream. The pressurization of the auxiliary
tunnel was due to the existence of several
openings in the aft region of the tunnel. An-
other possible failure mode was the separa-
tion of the leading edge of the meteoroid
shield from the shell of the workshop (par-
ticularly in the region of the folded ordnance
panel) of sufficient extent to admit ram air
pressures under the shield.
The venting analysis for the auxiliary
tunnel was predicated on a completely sealed
aft end; the openings in the tunnel thus re-
suited from a failure of communications
among aerodynamics, structural design, and
manufacturing personnel. The failure to
recognize the design deficiencies of the mete-
oroid shield through six years of analysis,
design and test was due, in part, to a pre-
sumption that the shield would be "tight to
the tank" and "structurally integral with the
S-IVB tank" as set forth in the design crite-
ria. In practice, the meteoroid shield was a
large, flexible, limp system that proved diffi-
cult to rig to the tank and to obtain the close
fit that was presumed by the design. These
design deficiencies of the meteoroid shield,
as well as the failure to communicate within
the project the critical nature of its proper
venting, must therefore be attributed to an
absence of sound engineering judgment and
alert engineering leadership concerning this
particular system over a considerable period
of time.
The overall management system used for
Skylab was essentially the the same as that
developed in the Apollo program. This sys-
tem was fully operational for Skylab; no con-
flicts or inconsistencies were found in the
records of the management reviews. None-
theless, the significance of the aerodynamic
loads on the meteoroid shield during launch
were not revealed by the extensive review
process. Possibly contributing to this over-
sight was the basic view of the meteoroid
shield as a piece of structure, rather than as
a complex system involving several different
technical disciplines. Complex, multidisci-
plinary systems such as the meteoroid shield
should have a designated project engineer
who is responsible for all aspects of analysis,
design, fabrication, test and assembly.
The Board found no evidence that the de-
sign deficiencies of the meteoroid shield were
the result of, or were masked by, the content
and processes of the management systems
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that were used for Skylab. On the contrary,
the rigor, detail, and thoroughness of the sys-
tems are doubtless necessary for a program
of this magnitude. At the same time, as a
cautionary note for the future, it is empha-
sized that management must always be alert
to the potential hazards of its systems and
take care that an attention to rigor, detail
and thoroughness does not inject an undue
emphasis on formalism, documentation, and
visibility in detail. Such an emphasis can
submer_e the concerned individual and de-
press the role of the intuitive engineer or
analyst. It will always be of importance to
achieve a cross-fertilization and broadened
experience of engineers in analysis, design,
test or operations. Positive steps must al-
ways be taken to assure that engineers be-
come familiar with actual hardware, develop
an intuitive understanding of computer-
developed results, and make productive use
of flight data in this learning process. The
experienced chief engineer, who can spend
most of the time in a subtle integration of all
elements of the system under purview, free
of administrative and managerial duties,
can also be a major asset to an engineering
organization.
THE SKYLAB PROGRAM
Skylab missions have several distinct goals:
to conduct Earth resources observations,
advance scientific knowledge of the sun and
stars, study the effects of weightlessness on
living organisms, particularly human, and
study and understand methods for the
processing of materials in the absence of
gravity. The Skylab mission utilizes the as-
tronaut as an engineer and as a research
scientist, and provides an opportunity for
assessing potential human capabilities for
future space missions.
Skylab uses the knowledge, experience
and technical systems developed during the
Apollo program along with specialized equip-
ment necessary to meet the program objec-
tives.
Figure 1 shows the Skylab in orbit. Its
largest element is the orbital workshop, a
cylindrical container 48 feet long and 22 feet
in diameter weighing some 78,000 pounds.
The basic structure of the orbital workshop
is the upper stage, or S-IVB stage, of the S-IB
and S-V rockets which served as the Apollo
program launch vehicle. The orbital work-
shop has no engines, except attitude control
thrusters, and has been modified internally
to provide a large orbiting space laboratory
and living quarters for the crew. The Sky-
lab 1 (SL-!) space vehicle included a payload
consisting of four major units---orbital work-
shop, airlock module, multiple docking
adapter, Apollo telescope mount--and a
two-stage Saturn-V (S-IC and S-II) launch
vehicle as depicted in Figure 2. To provide
meteoroid protection and thermal control, an
external meteoroid shield was added to cover
the orbital workshop habitable volume. A
solar array system (SAS) was attached to the
orbital workshop to provide electrical power.
The original concept called for a "wet
workshop." In this concept, a specially con-
structed S-IVB stage was to be launched
"wet" as a propulsive stage on the S-IB
launch system filled with propellants. The
empty hydrogen tank would then be purged
and filled with a life-supporting atmosphere.
A major redirection of Skylab was made on
July 22, 1969, six days after the Apollo 11
lunar landing. As a result of the successful
lunar landing, S-V launch vehicles became
available to the Skylab program. Conse-
quently, it became feasible to completely
equip the S-IVB on the ground for immediate
occupancy and use by a crew after it was in
orbit. Thus it would not carry fuel and
earned the name of"dry workshop."
The nominal Skylab mission called for
the launch of the unmanned S-V vehicle and
workshop payload SL-1 into a near-circular
(235 nautical miles) orbit inclined 50 degrees
to the equator. About 24 hours after the first
launch, the manned Skylab 2 (SL-2) launch
would take place using a command service
module payload atop the S-1B vehicle. After
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the command service module rendezvous and
docking with the orbiting cluster, the crew
enters and activates the workshop; Skylab is
then ready for its first operational period of
28 days. At the end of this period, the crew
returns to Earth with the command service
module, and the Skylab continues in an
unmanned quiescent mode for some 60 days.
The second three-person crew is launched
with a second S-IB, this time for a second
56-day period in orbit after which they will
return to Earth. The total Skylab mission
activities cover a period of roughly eight
months, with about 140 days of manned
operation.
THE FLIGHT OF SKYLAB 1
Skylab 1 was launched at 1730:00 (range
time, R=0) on May 14, 1973, from Complex
39 A, Kennedy Space Center. Atthis time,
the Cape Kennedy launch area was exper-
iencing cloudy conditions with warm tem-
peratures and gentle surface winds. Total
sky cover consisted of scattered cumulus at
2,400 feet, scattered stratocumulus at 5,000
feet, broken altocumulus at 12,000 feet, and
cirrus at 23,000 feet. During ascent, the
vehicle passed through the cloud layers but
no lightning was observed in the area. Upper
area wind conditions were being compared to
General Characteristics
Condition work volume 12,700 cu ft (354 cubic meters)
Overall length 117 ft (35.1 meters)
Weight including CSM 199,750 (90,606 Kilograms)
Width OWS including solar array 90 ft (27 meters)
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Figure 1 Skylab Cluster
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PS Payload Shroud
Diameter 6.6 meters (21.7 feet)
Length 16.8 meters
Weight 11,794 kilograms (26,000 lbs.)
ATM
Wi
Apollo Telescope Mount
Width 3.3 meters
Length 4.4 meters
Weight 11.181 kilograms (24,650 lbs.)
MDA Multiple Docking Adapter
Diameter 3 meters (lo feet)
Length 5.2 meters (17.3 feet)
Weight 6,260 kilograms t13,800 lbs.)
AM Airlock Module
Diameter STS 3 meters (10 feet)
Diameter FAS 6.6 meters t21.7feet)
Length 5.3 meters (17.5 feet)
Weight 22,226 kilograms (49,000 lbs.)
IU Instrument Unit
Diameter 6.6 meters (21.7 feet)
Length 0.9 meter (3 feet)
Weight 2,064 kilograms (4,550 lbs.)
OWS Orbital Workshop
Diameter 6.6 meters (21.7 feet)
Length 14.6 meters (48.5 feet)
Weight 35,380 kilograms (78,000 lbs.)
S-II Second Stage
Diameter 10 meters (33 feet)
Length 24.8 meters (81.5 feet)
Weight 488,074 kilograms (1,076,000 lbs.)
fueled
35,403 kilograms (78,050 lbs.) dry
Engines J-2 (5)
Propellants: Liquid Oxygen 333,837 liters
(88,200 gallons)
Liquid Hydrogen 1,030,655
liters (272,300 gallons)
Thrust 5,150,000 Newtons (1,150,000 lbs.)
Interstage Approx. 5,171 kilograms (11,400)
lbs.)
S-IC First Stage
Diameter 10 meters (33 feet)
Length 42 meters (138 feet)
Weight 2,245,320 kilograms (4,950,000 lbs.)
fueled
130,410 kilograms (287,500 lbs.) dry
Engines F-1 (5)
Propellants: Liquid Oxygen 1,318,315 liters
(348,300 gallons)
RP-1 (Kerosene) 814,910 liters
(215,300 gallons)
Thrust 31,356,856 Newtons (7,723,726 lbs.)
Figure 2 SL-1 vehicle
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most other Saturn-V flights. The flight envi-
ronment was quite favorable.
The automatic countdown proceeded nor-
mally with Guidance Reference Release oc-
curring at R-17.0 seconds and orbit insertion
occurring at R+599.0 seconds. The orbital
workshop solar array deployment was com-
manded on time; however, real-time data in-
dicated that the system did not deploy fully.
The solar array system (SAS) on the or-
bital workshop consists of two large beams
enclosing three major sections of solar cell
assemblies within each. During ascent, the
sections are folded like an accordion inside
the beams which in turn are stowed against
the workshop. The meteoroid shield is a
lightweight structure wrapped around the
converted S-IVB stage orbital workshop and
is exposed to the flight environment. The two
hinged solar array system wings are secured
to the orbital workshop by tie downs above
and below the meteoroid shield. Seals at-
tached to the solar array system perimeter
actually press against the shield to form an
airtight cavity prior to launch. Once in orbit,
the solar array system beams are first de-
ployed out 90 degrees. The meteoroid shield
is deployed later to a distance of about five
inches from the orbital workshop wall. After
the ordnance release is fired, meteoroid
shield deployment is effected by torsion rods
and swing links spaced around the structure
fore and aft. The rods are torqued prior to
launch and simply unwind in orbit to move
the meteoroid shield away from the tank,
Detection of pertinent conditions associated
with the meteoroid shield and solar array
system is afforded by measuring various pa-
rameters by telemetered instrumentation.
When the orbital workshop solar array
system was commanded to deploy, telemeter-
ed data indicated that events did not occur as
planned. The flight data was analyzed by
flight operations personnel to reveal the pos-
sible source of the problem. At about R + 60
seconds, the S-II telemetry reflected power
increased slightly. At about 63 seconds,
numerous measurements indicated the
apparent early deployment and loss of the
meteoroid shield. At this time, the vehicle
was at about 28,600 feet altitude and at a
velocity of about Mach 1.
At this time, vehicle dynamic measure-
ments such as vibration, acceleration, atti-
tude error, and acoustics indicated strong
disturbances. Measurements which are nor-
mally relatively static at this time, such as
torsion rod strain gauges, tension strap
breakwires, temperatures, and solar array
system position indicators, indicated a loss of
the meteoroid shield and unlatch of the
SAS-2 wing. Further preliminary evaluation
revealed abnormal vehicle accelerations, vi-
brations, and solar array system tempera-
ture and voltage anomalies at about R + 593
seconds. Temperature data loss and sudden
voltage drops indicated that the SAS-2 wing
was separated from the orbital workshop at
this time. Other data later in the flight indi-
cated the SAS-1 wing did not fully deploy
when commanded to do so. Although not ap-
parently associated with the 63-second and
593-second anomalies, the S-II stage range
safety receiver signal strengths showed sev-
eral drops throughout the flight beginning at
about R + 260 seconds.
63-SECOND ANOMALY: LOSS OF
METEROID SHIELD
The Investigation Board evaluated the te-
lemetry data in order to explain the various
anomalies that occurred on Skylab 1. The
first anomalous indication was an increase
in S-II telemetry reflected power from a
steady 1.5 W beginning at R + 59.80 seconds.
At this time the telemetry forward power
remained steady at 58.13 W. By 61.04 sec-
onds, the reflected power had reached
1.75 W, and by 80.38 seconds, the reflected
power had stabilized at about 2.0 W. This
abnormal increase in power might be in-
dicative of a vehicle physical configuration
change which altered the antenna ground
plane characteristic.
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Shortly after the telemetry reflected
power increase, the meteoroid shield torsion
rod 7 forward (measurement G7036) indicat-
ed a slight change toward the deployed
condition. This occurred at R+60.12 sec-
onds, and at 61.78 seconds the vehicle roll
rate decreased slightly from a normal value
of 1.1 degrees per second clockwise looking
forward. The next torsion rod 7 forward
sample at about 62.52 seconds revealed a
further relaxation. The increase in telemetry
reflected power and the movement of torsion
rod 7 forward tend to indicate meteoroid
shield lifting between positions I and II.
Between R+62.75 and 63.31 seconds,
several vehicle dynamic measurements
indicated a significant disturbance. A sensor
on the orbital workshop film vault showed an
abnormal vibration at 62.75 seconds fol-
lowed by disturbances sensed by X and Y
accelerometer pickups in the instrument
unit, the pitch, yaw, and longitudinal
accelerometers, and the pitch, yaw, and roll
rate gyros. At 62.78 seconds, the roll rate
gyro sensed a sudden clockwise roll rate re-
sulting in a peak amplitude of 3.0 degrees
per second clockwise 62.94 seconds. A sensor
at the instrument unit upper mounting
showed a maximum peak-to-peak shock of
17.2 g's at 63.17 seconds. In addition, the S-II
engine actuators experienced pressure fluc-
tuations caused by vehicle movement
against the inertia of the non-thrusting
engine nozzles.
The data indicate that the most probable
sequence of meteoroid shield failure was
initial structural failure of the meteoroid
shield between the SAS-2 wing and the main
tunnel (between positions I and II). The
initial failure propagation from this area
appears likely since the wardroom window
thermocouple indication (C7013) remained
normal at 62.94 seconds after SAS-2 indicat-
eel unlatched at 62.90 seconds and after the
K7010 and K7011 tension strap measure-
ments failed.
593-SECOND ANOMALY
As a consequence of the meteoroid shield
failure at approximately 63 seconds, the
SAS-2 wing was unlatched and partially de-
ployed as evidenced by minor variations in
the main solar array system electrical volt-
ages and SAS-2 temperatures. Full deploy-
ment was prevented due to the aerodynamic
forces and accelerations during the remain-
der of powered flight.
At the completion of the S-II phase of
flight, the four 35,000-pound thrust retro-
rockets fired for approximately two seconds
commencing at R+591.10 seconds followed
by spacecraft separation at 591.2 seconds.
The effect of retro-rocket plume impinge-
ment was observed almost immediately on
the SAS-2 temperature and on vehicle body
rates.
At 593.4 seconds the wing imparted mo-
mentum to the vehicle, probably by hitting
and breaking the 90 degree fully deployed
stops, and at 593.9 imparted a final kick as it
tore completely free at the hinge link. In-
orbit photographs show clearly the hinge
separation plane and the various wires
which were torn loose at the interface.
INTERSTAGE SECOND PLANE
SEPARATION ANOMALY
Post-flight analysis revealed unexpectedly
high temperatures and pressures in the S-H
engine compartment following ignition and
continued high after interstage separation
command. The unusually high temperatures
from S-II ignition and until the S-II inter-
stage separation signal are considered by
Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) to be
caused by a change in the engine heat shield
skirts introduced on this flight, and there-
fore do not indicate a problem. However, the
increasing temperatures after the time of
normal S-II interstage separation are indica-
tive of an abnormal condition. More detailed
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investigation based on performance evalua-
tion and axial acceleration time history re-
vealed that the interstage had not been
jettisoned; however, due to the vehicle per-
formance characteristics and performance
margin, the desired orbit was achieved.
Data analysis confirms that the primary
ordnance command was properly issued at
R + 189.9 seconds. The backup command was
issued 100 milliseconds later but the explod-
ing bridge wire circuit discharge was charac-
teristic of an open circuit consistent with
separation of the interstage disconnect by a
minimum of 0.25 inch.
The linear shaped charge is mounted cir-
cumferentially around the S-II interstage.
When fired by the primary command, the
charge cuts the tension straps (in the direc-
tion of position II to position I) allowing the
skirt to drop away. Normal propagation time
of the linear shaped charge is approximately
four milliseconds. Assuming a failure to
propagate completely around the structure,
analyses were made by appropriate contrac-
tor and government personnel to determine
what area must remain intact in order to re-
tain the skirt and what area must have been
cut to allow rotation of the skirt sufficient to
disconnect the connector panel. The various
analyses isolate the region of failure to an
arc extending from approximately E)=100
degrees to as much as G = 200 degrees.
This ordnance installation was different
from prior Saturn flights. Previously, a sin-
gle fire command from the instrumentation
unit was issued which simultaneously deto-
nated the linear shaped charge from both
ends allowing the charge to propagate from
both directions. On this flight, in an attempt
to provide redundant firing commands, the
detonators at each end of the linear shaped
charge were separately connected to two
command channels spaced 100 milliseconds
apart due to the characteristics of the air-
borne equipment. As a result of the partial
cutting of the interstage, it rotated suffi-
ciently to separate the electrical connector
prior to issuing the backup command.
A review of the history of manufacturing,
acceptance, checkout, qualification and
flight environment revealed no basic cause
for failure. The most probable cause is secon-
dary damage as a result of the meteoroid
shield failure, attributed to falling debris as
evidenced by the various shock and acoustic
disturbances occurring in the 63-second time
period.
The redundant mode of ordnance opera-
tion of all prior Saturn flights in which both
ends of the linear shaped charge are fired at
once from a single command would probably
have prevented the failure, depending on the
extent of damage experienced by the linear
shaped charge.
FORWARD INTERSTAGE INTERNAL
PRESSURE ANOMALY
Flight data indicated a deviation of the S-II
forward interstage pressure from analytical
values commencing at approximately 63 sec-
onds. Inasmuch as the deviation from the
analytical curve of the internal pressure ver-
sus time appeared to be coincident with the
meteoroid shield failure, it was postulated
that a portion of the shield had punctured
the forward interstage. On this basis, it was
possible to correlate the flight data with ei-
ther an assumed 2.0 square foot hole in the
conical section or an assumed 0.75 square
foot hole in the cylindrical section.
RANGE SAFETY RECEIVER ANOMALY
During the S-II portion of the flight, the sig-
nal strength indications from both range
safety receivers showed drops in level. From
liftoff through R+ 259 seconds, both receiv-
ers maintained relatively stable values
above range requirements. At R+259.57
seconds, receiver 2 signal strength began to
drop and between this time and 522.1 sec-
onds, both receivers indicated various de-
grees of signal strength shift. These signal
strength shifts dropped below the 12 db safe-
ty margins required by Air Force Eastern
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Test Range Manual 127-1. At R+ 327.81 sec-
onds the receiver 2 signal strength dropped
briefly below its threshold sensitivity. At
this instant this receiver probably would not
have responded to any range safety com-
mands. Receiver 1 was, however, capable of
receiving commands. At R÷521.16, receiv-
er 2 strength again dropped briefly to its
threshold sensitivity. None of these drops
could be correlated to ground system perfor-
mance.
Analysis indicates that the most probable
cause of the S-II receiver signal strength
dropout was a variable phase shift within
the vehicle's hybrid coupler due to the chang-
ing aspect angle produced by the moving
vehicle and the fixed transmitting site. Be-
cause the decrease in receiver signal
strength occurred with only one receiver at a
time, range safety commands could have
been received continuously throughout pow-
er flight. During two of these drops, however,
the planned redundancy of range safety re-
ceivers was not available.
During this investigation, it was revealed
that the Wallops Island and Bermuda
ground stations did not continuously record
ground transmitter power levels. The Board
considers that such continuous recordings
would be of value.
THE METEOROID SHIELD DESIGN
Although fairly simple in concept, the mete-
oroid shield had to provide such a variety of
functions that it was, in fact, a quite compli-
cated device. It was, foremost, a very lightly
built cylindrical structure 270 inches in di-
ameter (in the deployed condition) by 265
inches long.
In brief, the meteoroid shield is formed of
a set of sixteen curved sheets of 2014 T6 alu-
minum panels, 0.025 inches thick, assem-
bled at flanges and other fittings to form the
cylinder shown. The forward and aft ends
were reinforced with curved 7075 T6 angles.
Various special details were included in
the assembly in order to hold it in place,
deploy it in orbit, and provide access to the
orbital workshop interior during prelaunch
activities. The principal means of holding
the shield in place in orbit (and to a lesser
extent during powered flight) was a set of
tension straps under the main tunnel. These
straps were bonded to the orbital workshop
wall and fitted with a hinge on each end to
take the butterfly hinge that attaches to the
adjacent meteoroid shield panel. These
butterfly hinges were designed to rotate so
as to lie against the sides of the main tunnel
which enclosed the tension straps and var-
ious cable runs on the orbital workshop.
Clockwise from the tension straps and
butterfly hinge, the next special feature is
the auxiliary tunnel. This tunnel extends in
an arch between panels of the thin meteoroid
shield. The 28 titanium frames of this tunnel
provide a very springy section in the rela-
tively rigid hoop provided by the rest of the
shield. The auxiliary tunnel also encloses a
smaller tunnel covering the wiring for the
thruster attitude control system. Farther
around, in position I, there are two curved
rectangular smaller panels, included to pro-
vide access to the orbital workshop.
Between positions I and IV, the two
halves of the meteoroid shield overlap and
are joined by a series of 14 trunnion bolts and
straps. These trunnion bolts were used to ad-
just the tension with which the shield was
held against the orbital workshop. Adjusting
the bolts in the trunnion assemblies was a
major aspect in positioning and tightening
the meteoroid shield against the orbital
workshop (rigging).
In order to provide the extra 30 inches of
perimeter required when the meteoroid
shield was deployed, a foldout panel assem-
bly is included in the panel adjacent to the
trunnions. The only remaining distinctive
features of the meteoroid shield are the
panels located over the scientific airlock and
wardroom window at position HI. The mete-
oroid shield is completed at the butterfly
hinges and tension straps at position I.
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The deployment of the 265-inch-long meteor-
oid shield was accomplished by providing
two folding panel sections on each side of a
contained explosive pyrotechnic chain which
extended axially for the full length of the
shield except for short end reinforcements.
When the ordnance strip is fired and sepa-
rates the fold-over panel, the segments are
released and the shield is deployed. After re-
lease of this folded panel, a number of swing
arms are used to displace the shield away
from the orbital workshop wall and hold it
there. A rotational force is applied to these
swing arms by a total of sixteen torsion rods
suitably spaced around the ends of the mete-
oroid shield. When the meteoroid shield is
stowed for launch, there is a larger twist in
the torsion rods than after deployment. The
links on one side of the ordnance chain swing
in a direction opposite to those on the other
side. The butterfly hinges on each side of the
main tunnel permit the radial displacement
of the shield at the location of the tension
straps.
The meteoroid shield should therefore be
regarded as a very limp system, which de-
pends on being stretched tight around the
orbital workshop to withstand the aerody-
namic, vibratory, flutter and thrust loads at
launch. After deployment, it needs very little
strength to serve its primary objective as a
meteoroid shield.
The Auxiliary Tunnel
The auxiliary tunnel extends from the for-
ward skirt, down the full length of the mete-
oroid shield shield, and below the meteoroid
shield by about 57 inches. Venting of this
tunnel was provided through an outlet of 10
square inches under the corrugations of the
tunnel cover at the aft end of the forward
fairing. The tunnel was intended to be sealed
at the aft end by a rubber boot assembly in
both the stowed and deployed position. Note
that the tunnel is displaced some 5 or 6
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inches circumferentially upon deployment of
the shield.
The main structural members of the aux-
iliary tunnel are titanium, arch-shaped,
frame springs. These frames provide the
structural tie between two meteoroid shield
panels and provide both regulation of the
pre-loading of the meteoroid shield to the
orbital workshop and act as a flexible relief
for diametrical changes resulting from ther-
mal and pressure changes of the orbital
workshop.
The tunnel also serves to protect the
thrust attitude control system cables located
in a small channel-shaped cover permanent-
ly attached to the orbital workshop. A seg-
mented and corrugated outer skin form an
aerodynamic fairing for the complete system
and seals between forward and aft fairings.
Thermal Control
Although the primary purpose of the meteor-
oid shield is that of providing protection of
the orbital workshop from meteoroids, it also
plays a significant role in the thermal con-
trol system. Much of the overall thermal de-
sign was accomplished passively by painting
the outer surfaces of the meteoroid shield
black except for a large white cross-shaped
pattern on the Earth side during flight. The
entire surface of the orbital workshop wall
was covered with gold foil. The overall choice
of finishes biased the thermal design toward
the cold side, it being easier to vernier con-
trol by heating rather than cooling.
Friction between the Meteoroid Shield
and Orbital Workshop Wall
To provide a uniform tension throughout the
meteoroid shield upon assembly and rigging
for flight, and to permit transfer of the trun-
nion bolt tension into the frames of the auxil-
iary tunnel, it was necessary to minimize
friction between the shield and the external
surface of the orbital workshop. This was
accomplished by applying a Teflon coating to
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the entire inner surface of the meteoroid
shield assembly. Special care was also taken
to assure that all fastening rivets be either
flush with or below the Teflon surface of the
shield. In addition to considerations of
friction, the elimination of rivet head
protrusions was important in not damaging
the rather delicate gold surface used to pro-
vide the proper emissivity of the outer orbit-
al workshop wall surfaces as mentioned
above. This was a vapor-deposited gold sur-
face applied to a Kapton backing and bonded
to the outer workshop wall with an adhesive.
Panel Details
The sixteen panels comprising the meteoroid
shield were formed of 0.025 inch thick alumi-
num stock fitted with doublers and angles to
permit their assembly. In each of these panel
joints, 96 holes of 1/8-inch diameter were
drilled to vent any air trapped under the me-
teoroid shield skin. The special panel joint is
required next to the SAS-1 wing because of
the unavailability of sufficiently wide panel
stock for the panel under SAS-1. It was a
strap of metal of this special joint that be-
came embedded in the SAS-1 cover and pre-
vented automatic deployment of SAS-1 in or-
bit. It is, perhaps, of passing interest to note
the longer length of exposed bolts in this par-
ticular joint.
Around the top of the panels is located an
angle and a neoprene rubber rain or weather
seal. This seal was not intended to be an
aerodynamic seal and could not be expected
Forward
Fairing _ Shocks from
Forward
Fairing
High Pressure Leaks
Auxiliary
Tunnel
Meteoroid
Shield
Figure 3 Compressibility waves from the forward auxiliary tunnel fairing
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to accommodate significant relative deflec-
tions between the orbital workshop and me-
teoroid shield surfaces. To provide meteoroid
protection at the two ends of the meteoroid
shield, small strips of thin stainless steel
"fingers" were squeezed down between the
orbital workshop and the meteoroid shield
when stowed. The thrust load of the shield,
which weighs some 1200 pounds, is trans-
ferred to the forward flange of the aft skirt
through a group of twelve thrust blocks.
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The preceding analysis and discussion of pos-
sible failure modes of the meteoroid shield
have identified at least two ways that it
could fail in flight. Although the most prob-
able cause of the present failure was the lift-
ing of the shield from the orbital workshop
tank by excessive pressures in the auxiliary
tunnel, other failure modes could have oc-
curred in other regions of flight or under
more severe flight environments that were
encountered by Skylab 1.
Among these other modes of potential
failure, which could combine in various ways
under varying conditions of flight, are exces-
sive pressures under the forward edge of the
shield, or inadequate venting of the folded
ordnance panel. The inherently light spring
force of the auxiliary tunnel frames, the
crushing loads on these frames in flight, the
inherent longitudinal flexibility of the shield
assembly, the forces applied by the swing
links to deploy the shield, the possible
breathing of the shield panels as cavities are
vented, the noncylindrical nature of the un-
derlying pressurized tank, and the uncertain
tension loads applied to the shield in rigging
for flight all contribute to a lack of rigidity of
the shield and a weakness of its structural
integrity with the underlying tank struc-
ture.
A simple and straightforward solution to
these inherent problems of the present shield
design is therefore not likely. A fundamen-
tally different design concept seems in order.
One solution is, of course, to simply omit the
meteoroid shield, suitably coat the orbital
workshop for thermal control and accept the
meteoroid protection afforded by the orbital
workshop tank walls. Although the Board
has not conducted an analysis, meteoroid
flux levels are now known to be considerably
lower than those used in the original calcula-
tions. A new analysis, based on these flux
levels, may show acceptable protection.
Should some additional meteoroid protec-
tion be required, the Board is attracted to the
concept of a fixed, nondeployable shield.
Although the inherent weight advantages of
a separable bumper are not available in this
approach, the mission of Skylab could prob-
ably be satisfied in this manner. One concept
would be to bond an additional layer of metal
skin to the surface of the tank with a layer of
nonventing foam between the orbital work-
shop tank and the external skin. The prob-
lem being statistical in nature, the entire
shell of the orbital workshop would not have
to be covered.
POSTULATED SEQUENCE OF THE MOST
PROBABLE FAILURE MODE
The availability of flight data from the in-
strumentation on the meteoroid shield and
the vehicle disturbances, the design features
of the meteoroid shield, the solar array sys-
tem photographs taken in orbit, descriptions
by the astronauts, and other information
permit the following postulation of the prob-
able sequence of events associated with the
meteoroid shield failure.
In Figure 4, sketches and details of sa-
lient events are correlated to the roll rate
data around the 63 second anomaly period.
The events are designated on the figures by
times which are consistent with the avail-
able data.
60.12 Seconds - Meteoroid shield liftoff
and local inflation in the vicinity of the aux-
iliary tunnel was indicated by a small shift
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in position of the torsion rod on the forward
edge just to the left of the tunnel.
61.78 Seconds - Air entered the forward
fairing opening, raised the pressure under
the shield and high mass flows escaped
through the adjacent holes in the butterfly
hinge. This flow produced reactive force
causing a gradual decrease in roll rate be-
tween 61.78 seconds and 62.74 seconds.
62. 74 to 62. 79 Seconds - Burst pressure
under the auxiliary tunnel and adjacent me-
teoroid shield caused a large tangential load
on the forward section of the butterfly hinge,
causing the whole hinge to unzip. Fly around
inspection indicated that the failure of the
butterfly hinge occurred at the hinge line ad-
jacent to the main tunnel.
The butterfly hinge was now completely
broken. Aerodynamic drag on the meteoroid
shield including the bulky auxiliary tunnel
produced tension in the shield and pulled on
the vehicle so as to roll it in the direction
shown, that is, opposite to that noted earlier.
The large area and mass of this metal flag
induced a more rapid change in roll rate than
the earlier jetting through the butterfly
hinge. This process terminated as the mete-
oroid shield started to wrap around and lift
the SAS-2 wing.
62.79 to 62.90 Seconds - During this in-
terval the shield was wrapping around the
SAS-2 wing producing a negative roll torque
in the vehicle. At about 62.85 seconds the
SAS-2 tie-downs were broken.
62.90 Seconds - Upon release of the
SAS-2, the tension in the shield was trans-
ferred to the trunnions, causing failure of the
trunnion straps. Upon separation of this sec-
tion of the shield, the negative roll torque
ended.
62.90 to 62.95 Seconds - In this interval,
the remaining section of the meteoroid shield
began unwinding, introducing a large posi-
tive roll torque.
63.17 Seconds - A large shock was detect-
ed by the instrument unit upper mounting
ring vibration sensor due to the impact of the
separated section of the meteoroid shield
upon the conical adapter between the orbital
workshop and the SAS-1 stage.
63. 7 Seconds - The meteoroid shield con-
tinued to unwind and whip until 63.7 sec-
onds when it reached SAS-1 wing. As the me-
teoroid shield began to wrap around the
SAS-1 wing, a negative roll torque resulted.
The meteoroid shield then ripped apart from
top to bottom at the longitudinal joint adja-
cent to SAS-1, pulling a portion of the joint
assembly over the SAS-1 wing as the meteor-
oid shield section departed. From this point
on the vehicle showed normal response to its
roll control system.
POSSIBLE IMPACT OF COSTS AND
SCHEDULES ON THE METEOROID SHIELD
The origin of Skylab in late 1966--as an ex-
tension of the use of Apollo hardware for ex-
periments in Earth orbit--imposed an initial
environment of limited funding and strong
schedule pressures on the program. Skylab,
then designated the Apollo Applications Pro-
gram (AAP), was to fit in among the Apollo
flights under schedules imposed by the main-
line Apollo program. Funding was provided
out of the Apollo program and thus the needs
of Skylab competed with those of the higher
priority Apollo program.
The situation changed in mid-1969 when
Skylab became a major line item in its own
right and was to use a Saturn-V launch vehi-
cle with a dedicated, dry, orbital workshop.
From that point on, increased funding and
new flight schedules were established for
Skylab. Nonetheless, the original concept of
the meteoroid shield was retained when the
orbital workshop changed from Saturn-IB
propulsion stage to a dry workshop launched
by a Saturn-V. The Board was therefore
interested in determining the extent, if any,
that either the initial limitation of funds and
time, or any subsequent limitations, deter-
mined the design or thoroughness of develop-
ment of the meteoroid shield. This inquiry
was limited to the possible effect of funding
and schedule of the meteoroid shield as
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designed and flown on Skylab 1 and did not
consider whether meteoroid protection could
have or should have been provided in some
other way had the program not evolved as it
did.
In the Board's review of the evolution of
the meteoroid shield from initial design con-
cept, through testing and development, to fi-
SKYLAB 1
nal assembly for flight, particular attention
was devoted to any impacts arising from
limitation of funds or time. Extensive discus-
sions were also held with management per-
sonnel of MDAC-W, MSFC, JSC, and NASA
Headquarters on this matter. In no instance
could the Board find any evidence that the
design or testing of the meteoroid shield was
SAS-2
POS m
r-- SAS-I _i
SAS-2
SAS-2
i I Situation at 63.70Situation at 63.4
I
Figure 4 -- Postulated Sequence Failure Mode
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compromised by lack of funds or time. Pro-
gram personnel, both government and
contractor, had full confidence in the basic
concept of the meteoroid shield and thus saw
no need to alter the design when the change
to a dry, Saturn-V launched orbital work-
shop occurred. Given the concept that the
shield was to be maintained tight to the or-
bital workshop tank, and thus structurally
integrated with the well-established S-IVB
structure, the emphasis of testing given to
ordnance reliability and shield deployment
was considered proper. Neither the records of
Skylab nor the memories of key personnel
revealed any tests or analyses of the meteor-
oid shield that were considered desirable at
the time and which were precluded by lack of
funds or time.
THE SKYLAB MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
The management system utilized for the
Skylab program was derived directly from
that which had been developed and used in
the Apollo program. As such, it included a
series of formal reviews and certifications at
progressive points in the program life cycle
that are intended to provide visibility to con-
tractor and NASA management on program
status, problems and their resolution. The
selected review points and their primary
purpose are set forth in Skylab Program
Directive No. l lA, which is summarized as
follows:
Preliminary Requirements Review (PRR).
"To verify by formal review the suitability of
the conceptual configuration and to establish
the requirements and action necessary to
achieve a design baseline."
Preliminary Design Review (PDR). "To
verify by formal review the suitability of the
baseline design of the Contract End Item."
Critical Design Review (CDR). "To verify
by formal review the suitability of the design
of a Contract End Item when the design is es-
sentially complete."
Configuration Inspection (CI). "To certify
that the configuration for the Contract End
Item as being offered for delivery is in confor-
mance with the baseline established at the
CDR."
Certification of Flight Worthiness
(COFW). "To certify that each flight stage
module and experiment is a complete and
qualified item of hardware prior to ship-
ment."
Design Certification Review (DCR). "To
examine the design of the total mission com-
plex for proof of design and development ma-
turity."
Flight Readiness Review (FRR). "A con-
solidated review of the hardware, operation-
al and support elements to assess their
readiness to begin the mission."
The primary thrust of these key program
milestones is thus a formal review and certi-
fication of equipment design or program sta-
tus; the primary purpose being served is to
provide visibility into these matters to senior
NASA and contractor program manage-
ment. As noted in the Skylab Program Direc-
tive, the organization and conduct of the
review is a major responsibility of a senior
program or management official. For each
review, specific objectives are to be satisfied,
in conformance with preestablished criteria
and supported by specified documentation.
The reviews are thus highly structured and
formal in nature, with a major emphasis on
design details, status of various items and
thoroughness of documentation. Several
hundred specialists, subsystem engineers
and schedule managers are generally in at-
tendance.
The material presented in these reviews
is, of course, developed over a period of time
in many lower-level reviews and in monthly
progress reports dealing with various sys-
tems and subsystems. In addition, several
other major reviews peculiar to Skylab were
conducted, including the following:
Cluster System Review of December 1967
Mathew's Subsystem Review Team of
August 1970-July 1971
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. Critical Mechanisms Review of March
1971
. Systems Operations Compatibility
Assessment Review of October 1971-June
1972
• Structural/Mechanical Subsystem
Reviews of July 1971-May 1972
• Hardware Integrity Review of March
1973
• MSFC Center Director's Program
Reviews
There was thus no shortage of reviews. In
order to determine the consideration given to
the meteoroid shield throughout the pro-
gram, the Board examined the minutes, pre-
sentation material, action items, and
closeout of data of each of these reviews and
progress reports. In every case, complete
records and documentation were available
for inspection. In no case did the Board un-
cover any conflict or inconsistency in the
record. All reviews appeared to be in com-
plete conformance to Program Directive 11A
and were attended by personnel appropriate
to the subject matter under consideration.
The system was fully operational.
And yet, a major omission occurred
throughout this process--consideration of
aerodynamic loads on the meteoroid shield
during the launch phase of the mission.
Throughout this six year period of progres-
sive reviews and certifications the principal
attention devoted to the meteoroid shield
was that of achieving a satisfactory deploy-
ment in orbit and containment of the ord-
nance used to initiate the deployment. As
noted in the preceding section on possible
failure modes, design attention was also giv-
en to the strength of the hinges, trunnion
straps and bolts, to the crushing pressures on
the frames of the auxiliary tunnel, to flutter
and to the venting of both the auxiliary
tunnel and the several panels of the shield.
But never did the matter of aerodynamic
loads on the shield or aeroelastic interactions
between the shield and its external pressure
environment during launch receive the at-
tention and understanding during the design
and review process which in retrospect it de-
served.
This omission, serious as it was, is not
surprising. From the beginning, a basic de-
sign concept and requirement was that the
shield be tight to the tank. As clearly stated
in much of the early documentation, the me-
teoroid shield was to be structurally integral
with the S-IVB tank--a piece of structure
that was well proven in many previous
flights. The auxiliary tunnel frames, the con-
trolled torque on the trunnion bolts and the
rigging procedure itself were all specifically
intended to keep the shield tight against the
tank. The question of whether the shield
would stay there under the dynamics of
flight through the atmosphere was simply
not considered in any coordinated manner--
at least insofar as the Board could determine
by this concentrated investigation.
Possibly contributing to this oversight
was the basic view of the meteoroid shield as
a piece of structure. Organizationally, re-
sponsibility for the meteoroid shield at
MDAC-W was established to develop it as
one of the several structural subsystems,
along with such items as spacecraft struc-
ture and penetrations, pressure vessels, sci-
entific airlocks, protective covers and fin-
ishes. Neither the government, (MSFC), or
the contractor, (MDAC-W), had a full-time
subsystem engineer assigned to the meteor-
oid shield. While it is recognized that one
cannot have a full-time engineer on every
piece of equipment, it is nonetheless possible
that the complex interactions and integra-
tion of aerodynamics, structure, rigging
procedures, ordnance, deployment mecha-
nisms, and thermal requirements of the me-
teoroid shield would have been enhanced by
such an arrangement. Clearly, a serious fail-
ure of communications among aerodynamics,
structures, manufacturing and assembly
personnel, and a breakdown of a systems
engineering approach to the shield, existed
over a considerable period of time. Further,
the extensive management review and
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certification process itself, in its primary
purpose of providing visibility of program
status to management, did not identify these
faults.
Further insight into this treatment of the
meteoroid shield as one of several structural
subsystems is obtained by a comparison of a
listing of the design reviews conducted on
both the meteoroid shield and the solar array
system. At MDAC-W, the solar array system
was considered a major subsystem and was
placed under the direction of a full-time pro-
ject engineer.
The Board is impressed with the thor-
oughness, rigor and formalism of the man-
agement review system developed by Apollo
and used by Skylab. Great discipline is im-
posed upon everyone by this system and it
has served very well. In a large program as
geographically dispersed and intrinsically
complex as Skylab, such visibility of pro-
gram status and problems is a management
necessity. We therefore have no wish to alter
this management system in any basic man-
ner. But all systems created by humans have
their potential flaws and inherent hazards.
Such inherent flaws and weaknesses must be
understood by those who operate the system
if it is not to become their master. We there-
fore wish to identify some of those potential
flaws as they have occurred to us in this in-
vestigation, not to find fault or to identify a
specific cause of this particular flight failure
but to use this experience to further
strengthen the management processes of
large and complex endeavors.
As previously noted, the management
system developed by NASA for manned
space flight places large emphasis on rigor,
detail and thoroughness. In hand with this
emphasis comes formalism, extensive docu-
mentation, and visibility in detail to senior
management. While nearly perfect, such a
system can submerge the concerned individ-
ual and depress the role of the intuitive engi-
neer or analyst. It may not allow full play for
the intuitive judgment or past experience of
the individual. An emphasis on a manage-
ment system, can, in itself, serve to separate
the people engaged in the program from the
real world of hardware. To counteract these
potential hazards and flaws, we offer the fol-
lowing suggestions.
• Deployable systems or structures that
have to move, or that involve other
mechanisms, devices, or components in
their operation, should not be considered
as a piece of structure or be the basic re-
sponsibility of a structures organization.
• A complex, multi-disciplinary system
such as the meteoroid shield should possi-
bly have a designated project engineer
who is responsible for overseeing all as-
pects of analysis, design, fabrication, test
and assembly.
• Management must always strive to coun-
teract the natural tendency of engineers
to believe that a drawing is the real
world. First-hand experience with how
hardware behaves and can fail is of the
essence to design engineers. Possibly,
some design engineers should be required
to spend time in testing, operations, or
failure analysis. Such experience may not
contribute to cleverness or sophistication
of analysis, but something equally
valuable--actual experience--may be ad-
ded to the design group. An unfamiliarity
with hardware, first hand, makes it diffi-
cult to conceptualize a living, breathing,
piece of hardware from an analysis or a
drawing.
• The extensive use of the computer for
complex analyses can serve to remove the
analyst from the real world. One should,
therefore, require a simplified or support-
ing analysis that provides an understand-
able rationale for the phenomena under
consideration before accepting the results
of a computer analysis.
• The emphasis on "visibility to manage-
ment" in the review process should not be
extended to the point that one can be led
to believe the job is completed, or the de-
sign is satisfactory, when such visibility
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is provided. A major emphasis on status,
on design details, or on documentation
can detract from a productive examina-
tion of "how doesit work" or "what doyou
think."
Today's organizations seldom include the
old-fashioned chief engineer who, rela-
tively devoid of administrative or man-
agerial duties, brings total experience
and spendsmost of the time in the subtle
integration of all elements of the system
under purview. Perhaps we should more
actively seek and utilize these talented
individuals in an engineering organiza-
tion.
SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS
1) The launch anomaly that occurred at ap-
proximately 63 seconds after lift-off was
a failure of the meteoroid shield of the
orbital workshop.
2) The SAS-2 wing tie downs were broken
by the action of the meteoroid shield at
63 seconds. Subsequent loss of the SAS-2
wing was caused by retro-rocket plume
impingement on the partially deployed
wing at 593 seconds.
3) The failure of the S-II interstage adapter
to separate in flight was probably due to
damage to the ordnance separation de-
vice by falling debris from the meteoroid
shield.
4) The most probable cause of the failure of
the meteoroid shield was internal pres-
surization of its auxiliary tunnel. This
internal pressurization acted to force the
forward end of the tunnel and meteoroid
shield away from the orbital workshop
and into the supersonic air stream. The
resulting forces tore the meteoroid
shield from the orbital workshop.
5) The pressurization of the auxiliary tun-
nel resulted from the admission of high
pressure air into the tunnel through
several openings in the aft end. These
openings were: (1) an imperfect fit of the
tunnel with the aft fairing; (2) an open
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boot seal between the tunnel and tank
surface; and (3) open stringers on the aft
skirt under the tunnel.
6) The venting analysis for the tunnel was
predicated on a completely sealed aft
end. The openings in the aft end of the
tunnel thus resulted from a failure to
communicate this critical design feature
among aerodynamics, structural design,
and manufacturing personnel.
7) Other marginal aspects of the design of
the meteoroid shield which, when taken
together, could also result in failure dur-
ing launch are:
a) The proximity of the meteoroid
shield forward reinforcing angle to
the air stream
b) The existence of gaps between the or-
bital workshop and the forward ends
of the meteoroid shield
c) The light spring force of the auxil-
iary tunnel frames
d) The aerodynamic crushing loads on
the auxiliary tunnel frames in flight
e) The action of the torsion-bar actu-
ated swing links applying an out-
ward radial force to the meteoroid
shield
f) The inherent longitudinal flexibility
of the shield assembly
g) The nonuniform expansion of the
orbital workshop tank when pressur-
ized
h) The inherent difficulty in rigging for
flight and associated uncertain ten-
sion loads in the shield.
8) The failure to recognize many of these
marginal design features through six
years of analysis, design and test was
due, in part, to a presumption that the
meteoroid shield would be "tight to the
tank" and "structurally integral with
the S-IVB tank" as set forth in the
design criteria.
9) Organizationally, the meteoroid shield
was treated as a structural subsystem.
The absence of a designated project engi-
neer for the shield contributed to the
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lack of effective integration of the
various structural, aerodynamic, aeroe-
lastic, test fabrication, and assembly
aspects of the meteoroid shield system.
10) The overall management system used
for Skylab was essentially the same as
that developed in the Apollo program.
This system was fully operational for
Skylab; no conflicts or inconsistencies
were found in the records of the manage-
ment reviews. Nonetheless, the signifi-
carce of the aerodynamic loads on the
meteoroid shield during launch was not
revealed by the extensive review pro-
cess.
11) No evidence was found to indicate that
the design, development and testing of
the meteoroid shield were compromised
by limitations of funds or time. The
quality of workmanship applied to the
meteoroid shield was adequate for its
intended purpose.
12) Given the basic view that the meteoroid
shield was to be completely in contact
with and perform as structurally inte-
gral with the S-IVB tank, the testing
emphasis on ordnance performance and
shielddeployment was appropriate.
13) Engineering and management person-
nel on Skylab, on the part of both con-
tractor and government, were available
from the prior Saturn development and
were highly experienced and adequate
in number.
14) The failure to recognize these design
deficiencies of the meteoroid shield, as
well as to communicate within the pro-
jectthe criticalnature of itsproper vent-
ing, must therefore be attributed to an
absence of sound engineering judgment
and alert engineering leadership con-
cerning this particular system over a
considerable period oftime.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
1) If the backup orbital workshop or a simi-
lar spacecraft is to be flown in the
future, a possible course of action is to
omit the meteoroid shield, suitably coat
the orbital workshop for thermal con-
trol, and accept the meteoroid protection
afforded by the orbital workshop tank
walls. If, on the other hand, additional
protection should be necessary, the
Board is attracted to the concept of a
fixed, nondeployable shield.
2) To reduce the probability of separation
failures such as occurred at the S-II in-
terstage Second Separation Plane, both
linear shaped charges should be detonat-
ed simultaneously from both ends. In
addition, all other similar ordnance
applications should be reviewed for a
similar failure mode.
3) "Structural" systems that have to move
or deploy, or that involve other mecha-
nisms, equipment or components for
their operation, should not be the exclu-
sive responsibility of a structures orga-
nization.
4) Complex, multi-disciplinary systems
such as the meteoroid shield should have
a designated project engineer who is
responsible for all aspects of analysis,
design, fabrication, test and assembly.
OBSERVATIONS ON THE
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
The Board found no evidence that the design
deficiencies of the meteoroid shield were the
result of, or were masked by, the content and
processes of the management system that
were used for Skylab. On the contrary, the
rigor, detail, and thoroughness of the system
are doubtless necessary for a program of this
magnitude. At the same time, as a caution-
ary note for the future, it is emphasized that
management must always be alert to the po-
tential hazards of its systems and take care
that an attention to rigor, detail and thor-
oughness does not inject an undue emphasis
on formalism, documentation, and visibility
in detail. Such an emphasis can submerge
the concerned individual and depress the
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role of the intuitive engineer or analyst. It
will always be of importance to achieve a
cross-fertilization and broadened experience
of engineers in analysis, design, test or oper-
ations. Positive steps must always be taken
to assure that engineers become familiar
with actual hardware, develop an intuitive
understanding of computer-developed re-
sults, and make productive use of flight data
in this learning process. The experienced
chief engineer, whose time can be spent in
the subtle integration of all elements of the
system under review, free of administrative
and managerial duties, can also be a major
asset to an engineering organization.
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